Showing posts with label Troubled Asset Relief Program. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Troubled Asset Relief Program. Show all posts

Friday, May 1, 2009

A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come

Stress test results delayed some more. Via Bloomberg.

Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Whose Idea Was This, Anyway?

Andrew Ross Sorkin writes that the government is now trying to make us forget about the whole stress test thing.

Friday, April 24, 2009

Not Material as a Matter of Law?

So, apparently, the stress tests are over and the banks did fine. And that, sweetheart, is all you need to know. The Treasury says it will release the results on May 4th. Presumably, they're giving the banks a chance to get their spin right?

It is public knowledge which banks were tested. What's more, according to a partner at Alston & Bird tested banks that enter into a capital support agreement with treasury have to file an 8-K. But what about the stress test results? Do the results have to be disclosed?

Public companies can't make an untrue statement of material fact or omit a material fact that would make other statements misleading. A fact is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the fact important. That rule comes from the Supreme Court (TSC v. Northway, 426 US 438) and has been enshrined in SEC rules 405 and 12b-2. The occurrence of the stress test is a fact and probably noteworthy to yer reasonable investor, but the results aren't facts. The results are projections based on assumptions about the state of the economy and on that count, the law isn't settled:
Current tests for determining the materiality of predictive or projective information range from case-by-case balancing of the information's potential aid against its potential harm to investors to rulings that predictive information, as a matter of law, is not material.

MATERIALITY OF PREDICTIVE INFORMATION AFTER BASIC: A PROPOSED TWO-PART TEST OF MATERIALITY 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 207, 208 (.1990)


Thursday, April 16, 2009

Blogging Goldman's Agreement II: the fake investor

"WHEREAS, the United States Department of the Treasury (the "Investor") may from time to time agree to purchase shares of preferred stock and warrants from eligible financial institutions which elect to participate in the Troubled Asset Relief Program Capital Purchase Program ("CPP");"

Goldman's agreement with Treasury certainly looks like an ordinary securities purchase agreement. But, as was later revealed, Treasury is not an ordinary investor. For one thing, Treasury doesn't appear to have to power to bind the United States Government. Back in October of 2008, when Goldman signed up for the Capital Purchase Program, the attached executive compensation strings were contained in section 111(b) of the Emergency Economic Stabilzation Act of 2008. Section 4.10 of the securities purchase agreement memorializes the intention of the company to "ensure that its Benefit Plans with respect to Senior Executive Officers comply in all respects with section 111(b) of the EESA."

Then Congress changed the rules. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, passed in February 2009 by the newly-minted 111th Congress, established new, retroactive executive compensation rules for TARP recipients. Effectively, Congress went over Treasury's head and unilateraly amended a bunch of exisiting contracts. This is an emergency and things have been done in a hurry so no one is going to squawk about changed terms, but is it any wonder that TARP recipients want out of these agreements?

See Part 1 of Blogging Goldman's Agreement

Wednesday, April 15, 2009

Blogging Goldman's Agreement With Treasury

With Goldman Sachs announcing its intention to be the Snake Plisskin of TARP, I thought it might be a good time to take a closer look at how one escapes from the Treasury's Capital Purchase Program (CPP).

FinancialStability.gov has a great new page with links to all the various CPP agreements. The standard CPP terms envision a three year relationship between the bailed-out bank and the Treasury. Section 5 of the Standard Terms provides that the securities issued to Treasury may not be redeemed "prior to the dividend repayment falling on or after the third anniversary of the Original Issue Date."

If the bank wants out before three years they have to get permission from the "Appropriate Federal Banking Agency" and they have to sell Tier 1 equity (a "Qualified Equity Offering") amounting to 25% of the value of the securities issued to Treasury (the "Minimum Amount"). Goldman got $10 billion from the CPP so they need to sell $2.5 billion in equity to throw off the yoke of Treasury.

Thursday, April 9, 2009

Blogs That Track Stimulus

As if you don't have enough to do - below is a quick list of blogs that track bailout and stimulus developments.

US Budget Watch
Stimulus Watch
Bailout Sleuth

Tuesday, April 7, 2009

Did Anyone Get the Number of that Special Purpose Vehicle?

An article in this weekend's Washington Post set off an ado by reporting that the Federal Reserve is circumventing the executive compensation restrictions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (HR 1). The Fed is distributing money through special purpose entities so that TARP money isn't, technically, coming from the government. Whether you're fer or agin you have to wonder why its being done this way.

Section 111(a)(3) of HR 1 applies executive compensation limits to any entity receiving "financial assistance" under TARP. The New York Fed has decided that financial assistance depends on intent. The TALF program, for instance, is intended to stimulate consumer auto lending. Therefore, ABS sponsors participating in the program aren't being bailed out - people who buy cars are.

The New York Fed explains that "Executive compensation restrictions are targeted towards ensuring that executives of institutions that receive government support are not unjustly enriched at the taxpayers’ expense. Given the goals of the TALF and the desire to encourage market participants to stimulate credit formation and utilize the facility, the restrictions will not be applied to TALF sponsors."

This appears to be a straightforward question of Congressional intent. So, why not just ask Congress? Why all the sneaking around? My guess is that the Fed is afraid to raise the issue at all. Even if Congress did draft too broadly, chances are no one is going to have the nerve to face the public wrath that would flow from loosening executive compensation restrictions in the bailout law.

Wednesday, April 1, 2009

TARP Update Hearing

Witness statements from yesterday's TARP six-month update are available on the Senate Finance Committee website.

Tuesday, February 10, 2009

Financial Stability Plan

A promised, Treasury Secretary Geitner has given a speech "introducing" the Treasury's Financial Stability Plan ...

"which will be available on a new website FinancialStability.gov, [and] will give the American people the transparency they deserve."

So far, the website doesn't have anything but the speech. Other highlights:

"First, we're going to require banking institutions to go through a carefully designed comprehensive stress test ..."

Second, ... we will establish a Public-Private Investment Fund. This program will provide government capital and government financing to help leverage private capital to help get private markets working again.

Third, ... we are prepared to commit up to a trillion dollars to support a Consumer and Business Lending Initiative.

Finally, we will launch a comprehensive housing program"

Monday, February 9, 2009

Groveling Toward Stability

The Treasury Department announced that it would delay until tomorrow releasing the details of the administration's "Financial Stability and Recovery Plan," TARP to you and me, because Secretary Geitner is spending today helping coax the Senate into passing the bailout bill (HR 1).

Click here to see the timetable for tomorrow's news conference.

Getting Our Priorities Straight

Bloomberg surmised that the federal government may force GM and Chrysler into bankruptcy to ensure that bailout loans get priority over loans from other lenders.

For even more see Reuters and Barrons

Congressional Budget Office on the Bailout

The Congressional Budget Office has been busily assessing the cost vs. the value of stuff and publishing everything on their terrifically useful website. For instance, over the last couple of days they've assessed the long-term economic impact of the stimulus package that passed the House and the version being debated in the Senate. They have also estimated the value of the assets the Treasury bought (Treasury got ripped off).

Friday, February 6, 2009

Rashomon Blog Roundup #1: I (heart) Banks!

Am I the only one who wishes to never again hear the name Madoff? It is well and truly clear that the SEC's screwup was epic and few begrudge Harry Markopolos his I-told-you-so moment, but please, let's think about what comes next. For them that agrees with me, I offer a roundup of Madoff-free blog posts:

On the Harvard Corporate Governance Blog, Lucien Bebchuk offers analysis of the Tresury's new executive compensation rules.

From John Carney, via Clusterstock, a cow-based explanation of AIG's collapse.

DealLawyers offers John Jenkins' discussion of Pfizer's huge reverse break-up fee (Pfizer/Wyeth merger agreement is attached to a Wyeth 8-K filed 1/29/09)

The Business Law Prof. analyzes the many questions raised by a Wall Street Journal article about the Bank of America / Merrill Lynch merger.

Race to the Bottom offers a great dissection of the executive compensation bits of HR 7321, the Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act.

Reuters DealZone has a post about how TARP banks are using tapayer money to take out newspaper ads in hopes of making themselves more loveable. Its working on me.

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Treasury Exec Comp Rules

The Treasury has posted new executive compensation rules for TARP institutions. In addition to pulling the emergency brake on the whole excessive-executive-compensation thing, the Treasury release gives us new terms to learn: "generally available capital access" and "exceptional assistance." To quote:
The guidelines distinguish between banks participating in any new generally available capital access program and banks needing "exceptional assistance."

Banks falling under the "exceptional assistance" standard have bank-specific negotiated agreements with Treasury. Examples include AIG, and the Bank of America and Citi transactions under the Targeted Investment Program.

Executives at exceptional assistance banks:
* can't make more than $500,000 total except for restricted stock (which doesn't vest until the government gets its money back)
* are subject to "say on pay"
* are subject to clawback for deceptive practices
* must get board approval for "luxury expenditures"

Executives at generally available capital access banks (GACAB?) get a slightly easier time:
* their $500,000 cap can be waived by shareholder vote

Who's going to bail out Lear Jet?

Friday, January 30, 2009

WB SEC Currents Extra: TARP comments, staggered boards

Trends noted by Westlaw Business' SEC Currents Extra:

Recent staff comment letters show that the SEC is looking more closely at how companies are spending their TARP windfall.

Part one of a two-part article on takeover defense focuses on companies that have proposed to adopt staggered board structures.

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Briefly Noted: we knew this would end in tears

The Washington Post reports that the Treasury's top TARP watchdog is getting ready to ask companies that got TARP money to report how they've used it: "Once he makes the request, Neil M. Barofsky said the firms would have 30 days to comply."

The SEC has released two new Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations. They're in Q&A format and they "comprise the Division’s interpretations of the rules" One covers Securities Act Rules and the other is about going private transactions under rule 13e-3.

The President's Working Group announced the issuance of two reports about the hedge fund industry. Both are from private-sector committees working at the behest of the PWG. One report is from a committee of asset managers and the other is from a committee of investors. Click here for the committees' website.

Bloomberg reports that the Chair of the House Agriculture Committee is circulating a draft bill that would ban most credit default swaps.

The SEC Actions blog asks "Three Key Questions About The Future Of The SEC And Securities Regulation"

An investor in one of the Madoff feeder funds has sued the SEC. Lots of coverage of this one - Reuters, WSJ, but only this one has video of the investor crying. *sigh*

Monday, January 26, 2009

New TARP Documents Roundup

Larry Summers' letter to Congressional leaders regarding future of TARP.

Treasury loans a billion and change to Chrylser.

Lots of new executive compensation rules for TARP institutions.

Thursday, January 15, 2009

TARP Reform Bill in House

The House is currently considering HR 384: The TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009, proposed by Barney Frank. It's a big bill. In addition to imposing lots of requirements on institutions that got TARP money it has provisions aimed directly at benefiting homeowners and car companies.

Friday, January 9, 2009

Briefly Noted: TARP Redux; Pequot, Pequot, Pequot

Another terrific article from the increasingly genuis Currents Extra on banks that have gone back for more TARP money.

And ... Pequot. Again!

Monday, December 29, 2008

Happy Boxing Day, GMAC

On the 26th, the Federal Reserve announced that GMAC's quest to become a bank holding company had ended succesfully. As I blogged last week, it has been a long road. Let's hope they show their appreciation by boxing up something for the poor.More from Reuters.