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During Yesterday's earnings call, Jamie Diamond of JP Morgan Chase announced that his bank wouldn't be participating in the Treasury's toxic asset repurchase program, "We have no intent on using PPIP at all," he said, "I don't think toxic assets is the problem."
Click here for Marketplace's capsule report and here to see the earnings release and hear the whole conference call.
WB Legal Currents has a useful outline of the toxic asset purchase plans and links to related SEC disclosure documents.
They also mention that one of the side effects of the rebirth of the MBS market will be that real valuations will be available for toxic assets. Mark-to-market + fire-sale prices may mean a balance sheet bloodbath for holders. Will holders keep their toxics in hopes of getting a better offer?
The Business Law Prof worries that hedge funds may use the program, buy credit default swaps and end up with zero exposure.
The Harvard Corporate Governance Blog has a post from the authors of Davis Polk's 30-page detailed analysis of the entire Treasury financial stability plan to date. The post is followed by a link to the memo.
The Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) have unveiled their mechanisms for creating a market for subprime mortgages and their related securities derivatives (which they've decided to call "legacy assets"). The program is sketched out in this Treasury Department press release (tg-65). Scroll down to the bottom for links to the contracts and FAQs (how can a brand new program have frequently asked questions).
For bad mortgages, the FDIC will match assets and purchasers. Purchase money will be made up of a small equity stake and FDIC guaranteed-debt. The equity contribution will be split between the purchaser and the FDIC and will be leveraged six-to-one.
This helpful explanation is from the press release:
Sample Investment Under the Legacy Loans Program
Step 1: If a bank has a pool of residential mortgages with $100 face value that it is seeking to divest, the bank would approach the FDIC.
Step 2: The FDIC would determine, according to the above process, that they would be willing to leverage the pool at a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio.
Step 3: The pool would then be auctioned by the FDIC, with several private sector bidders submitting bids. The highest bid from the private sector – in this example, $84 – would be the winner and would form a Public-Private Investment Fund to purchase the pool of mortgages.
Step 4: Of this $84 purchase price, the FDIC would provide guarantees for $72 of financing, leaving $12 of equity.
Step 5: The Treasury would then provide 50% of the equity funding required on a side-by-side basis with the investor. In this example, Treasury would invest approximately $6, with the private investor contributing $6.
Step 6: The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool and the timing of its disposition on an ongoing basis – using asset managers approved and subject to oversight by the FDIC.
There will be two programs for purchasing mortgage-backed securties. The first will simply extend TALF to mortgage-backed securities issued before 2009 (and initially rated triple-A). The second would allow approved, seasoned MBS poolers to raise an investment fund which the FDIC would then match dollar-for-dollar.