The Harvard Corporate Governance blog has posted Francis G. X. Pileggi's rebuttal (complete with sneaky digs, "My cursory review ... is not as scholarly ... I do not have the time (thankfully, due to my busy practice)" to Race to the Bottom's 5 Worst Delaware Cases of 2008.
The Delaware Court of Chancery won't stay proceedings in County of York v. Merrill Lynch & Co. in favor of proceedings in the Southern District of New York. The Court found that a year-old SDNY suit against Merrill alleging poor risk management practices was not substantially similar to the County of York's action seeking to block Merrill's merger with B of A. (2008 WL 4824053)
Nixon Peabody has just released its annual survey of the law regarding material adverse change clauses. Deal Professor has a nice overview of the findings.
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the business judgment rule doesn't protect directors who make, "an unintelligent or unadvised judgment." (Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858) In the words of Chancellor Strine, "After Van Gorkom met an unenthusiastic reception, the General Assembly adopted § 102(b)(7)." 102(b)(7) allows a company to insert into its certificate of incorporation a provision, "limiting personal liability of a director ... for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty ..."
In three recent cases the Chancery Court has given shape to the jurisprudence of section 102(b)(7).
The cases are:
McPadden v. Sidhu, 2008 WL 4017052 Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical, 2008 WL 4174038 In Re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 2008 WL 4053221
For detail about the holdings look at this post on the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog.
To help you find precedents, here's the exculpatory provision from Lear Corp.'s certificate of incorporation:
(e) No director shall be personally liable to the Corporation or any of its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyally to the Corporation or its stockholders, (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, (iii) pursuant to Section 174 of the Delaware General Corporation Law or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
*These figures alone will enable the economic historian of the future to describe the unhealthy prosperity of 1929 and the inevitable grief and suffering that followed in the succeeding years--grief and suffering that overwhelmed and carried away not merely the speculative gains of those who participated in the speculative debauch ... but eventually the operating profits of every business in the country no matter how unrelated to stock exchanges.
Sam Rayburn's introdution to H.R. Rep 73-1383, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess. 1934, 1934 WL 1290