Showing posts with label AIG. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AIG. Show all posts

Friday, June 12, 2009

Block 41, Lot 1

As you've probably heard, a piece of Manhattan real estate is changing hands for the second time since 1932. The building, at number 70 Pine Street, is owned by American International Realty and will be acquired by two Korean companies, Young Woo & Associates and Kumho Investment Bank. 70 Pine was the third-tallest building in the world when it was completed in 1932. From that time until 1974 it was the headquarters of Cities Service Corporation, an oil and gas company founded by the monumentally pugnacious Henry L. Doherty. Cities Service moved to Tulsa in 1974 and sold 70 Pine to AIG in 1976. According the the New York Times, the building cost about $15 million to build. I couldn't find any record of what AIG paid for it, but it was probably a pretty good investment. It was recently assessed at 97.2 million.

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

A Theory of Executive Suite Relativity

People are understandably annoyed at AIG. Their conversion of bailout money into a personal windfall was ... surprising. Guest poster Mark Schwartz (our first!) argues that we can't understand the behavior of AIG executives because they inhabit a different reality.
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The past several decades have seen a massive transfer of wealth from shareholders and rank and file employees to senior level executives. This shift has placed normal people and corporate managers in parallel realities. Like the Bourbons at Versailles, executives seem incapable of understanding what the little people are so exercised about. This problem didn’t start with AIG, or even the financial sector generally. By creating an expectation of kleptocrat-level compensation, the twin instrumentalities of bonuses and stock options shifted the frame of reference in the executive suite. Stock options were supposed to be the ultimate way to tie performance to compensation, but when performance lagged, ways were found (backdating, resets) to make sure pay did not.

So these days, when a company files for bankruptcy, immediately after voiding union contracts, executives award themselves retention bonuses. Retention bonuses for the structured finance group at AIG? When Nick Leeson lost seven billion dollars of Barings' money he got no bonus. He got prosecuted.

Adding further fuel to the fire, senior government regulators either grew up within this system or are so besotted by the larger-than-life folks they are supposed to regulate that they also seem unable to understand how this plays to the public. It is not that government officials knew about these AIG bonuses but rather, that they were caught off guard by the visceral fury of the American public. How, other than by drinking the Kool-Aid themselves, could they be surprised?

So far, Obama's appointees (And I like him very much) don’t seem to be breaking the pattern. Was Mary Shapiro's tenure at FINRA so stellar that she should head the SEC? Why not Andrew Cuomo? The only one I trust is Sheila Bair. She at least has her heart in the right place.

Monday, March 23, 2009

Exit, Pursued by a Bear:

Warren Buffet, font of pith, said that when the tide goes out you see who's swimming naked. At AIG they weren't swimming at all: you could see their little heads, but their bodies had been eaten by piranhas.

Here's a smattering of AIG-iania, and let us never speak of them again:

From Dealscape: is AIG planning to change its name?
From Joe Nocera: Dear Congress - please move on.
From the Bete Noire itself: reluctant disclosure of CDS counterparties
From Lucian Bebchuk: is AIG really too big to fail?

Thursday, March 19, 2009

Sorry, Professor Chen

It has been a long time since I took constitutional law, but the first thing I thought when I heard about the whole tax-their-bonuses approach of HR 1586 is that it sounded vaguely unconstitional-ish. In an interview with the WSJ Law Blog Lawrence Tribe makes very short work of any such arguments.

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

The Poor Workman Blames His Tools

It was recently disclosed that a lot of the government money given to A.I.G. ended up in the hands of Goldman Sachs. Reuters has 10 questions for Goldman Sachs (and GS' "answers"): "The majority of Goldman Sachs' CDS (credit default swap) exposure to AIG Financial Group was collateralized. That means that Goldman Sachs had collateral."

None of this is a surprise - in fact it gets at the heart of why A.I.G. continues to be propped up. Other institutions bought insurance from A.I.G. and their continued survivial depends upon A.I.G. being able to pay. As I blogged a few months ago, a typical CDS transaction has a built-in collateral call when either the underlying obligation or the insurer runs into financial trouble. What this means in practice is that both A.I.G.'s precarious financial state and the collapse of the ABS market translate into an ongoing obligation for A.I.G. to shovel money to the parties who bought the CDS'. A.I.G. was the only player in the CDS casino dopey enough to place bets in only one direction.

If A.I.G. is just a funnel the government uses to keep other instituitions afloat I think it is reasonable to ask why something else won't do just as well?

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

Wish I'd Thought of it First Department

Wonderful article in WB Legal Currents today about the interlocking pieces of the disaster that is: The Notorious A.I.G.