Showing posts with label SOX. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SOX. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Sarbanes-Oxley and the Fallacy of Independence

Yesterday, I spent some time researching the directors of Enron. What I discovered made wonder whether the post-Enron reforms, particularly the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are capable of doing what they were designed to do. It even made me think that the laws might be grounded on faulty reasoning.

The most significant product of the corporate scandals of the late 1990’s was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”, PL 107-204). SOX, of course, apotheosized the idea of the independent director as watchdog. SOX section 301 requires a public corporation’s audit committee (SOX is only concerned with audit committees – broader requirements for director independence actually come from NYSE and NASDAQ rules) be composed entirely of “independent” directors. Independence means no extra payola and no affiliation with the issuer or its subsidiaries. Affiliation is a two-way street and it comes down to control. An affiliate is someone who controls or is controlled by the issuer. Control is the power to direct via ownership of stock or by contract (see: Bostelman, The Sarbanes-Oxley Deskbook, PLIREF-SAROX s 11:3-3).

In the SOX cosmology corporate officers are compromised by their emotional and financial investment in a corporation’s fate, and must be isolated from other management players like auditors and lawyers. In the words of Byron Dorgan, “There is something rotten going on inside some of these corporations,” (Cong. Rec. pp S5249 – 5251, 2002 WL 32054458). For instance, section 203 of SOX requires auditors be rotated to ensure that they don’t lose their objectivity by getting too friendly with management.

But, according to Woodrow Wilson scholar (and Enron board member) Herbert Winokur, Enron’s board *was* independent. As he told the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, “Enron’s board was composed of 12 independent directors and 2 inside directors.” And, he’s right – according to Enron’s 2000 proxy statement (Def 14A, 5/2/00), of the 17 directors listed, only three are Enron employees (Lay, Skilling, and John Urquhart who is Lay’s “Senior Advisor”). If we expand the group to include anyone who’d lose their “independent” status under SOX 301 we get five more names (for a total of 8): Robert Belfer, Lay’s business partner and CEO of Belco, an Enron sub, John Duncan, director of Enron sub Azurix, Ken Harrison, CEO of Enron sub Portland Gas & Electric, Rebecca Mark-Jusbasche, CEO of Azurix, and Winokur himself, a director of Azurix.

Pretty cozy, right? You can just imagine the plotting of nefarious doings. But to assess whether SOX 301 can really improve corporate governance ask yourself this (or, allow me to ask it for you): if management’s financial and emotional investment is the problem and an independent board is the solution, does this law really make an independent board possible?

To answer that question, let’s look at the other people on the Enron board, circa 2000. Wendy Gramm and John Wakeham may not have been personally invested in Enron, but both staked their professional careers on the wisdom of deregulating the energy business. Gramm, an economist and wife of Senator Phil Gramm, was head of the CFTC under the first President Bush. Responding to an Enron petition, she, in the waning days of her tenure, exempted energy commodities and swaps from CFTC regulation (CFTC 3620-93, 1993 WL 13822). As Margaret Thatcher’s Secretary of State for Energy, Lord Wakeham was the man in charge of privatizing England’s electricity industry, and as the Independent observed, “Enron was the first US company to benefit from his work.” Gramm and Wakeham are independent by the SOX standard, but Enron’s success would prove the wisdom of their professional decisions.

Also on Enron’s 2000 slate are Charles Lemaistre and John Mendelsohn, respectively, the former and current directors of the MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston. Enron was based in Houston, and it is certainly a possibility that Lay and Skilling knew Lemaistre and Mendelsohn socially.

I don’t mean to imply that Lemaistre, Mendelsohn, Gramm or Wakeham were in on the scam - quite the opposite. The officers of Enron were running a criminal enterprise and they cleverly populated the board with people who had built-in reasons for wanting Enron to succeed. They capitalized on personal connections and political agendas alike to create a passive overseer.

So, that’s my point – distinctions between inside and outside mean nothing when you’re dealing with a con. Con artists draw people in and then they use them - for money or just for their good name - and that’s already illegal.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

SOX Not Suited to Private Suit

Race to the Bottom is on a roll (to the bottom, presumably). Today they discuss In Re Digimark Corp. Derivative Litigation (549 F.3d 1223) a Ninth Circuit case where the court found that there is no private right of action under SOX section 304.

Two kinds of securities law causes of action give private parties the right to sue: sections that explicitly create a private right of action, and sections which declare certain actions, “unlawful,” and which have been held by courts to imply a right to maintain a civil action. Section 11 and 12 of the ’33 Act, for instance, create explicit private rights of action. Section 10(b) of the '34 Act has been held to create an implied private right of action. Implied rights of action have a long history in the courts, but they are presently out of favor. It is reasonable to expect that the Supreme Court will not find any new implied rights of action. Presently, there are only 3: 10(b), 14a-9, and 14(e).

The decision is available on RTB's sister site at the University of Denver Law School.

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Though this be madness, yet there is method in ’t

The Daily Deal has an interesting discussion of how an SEC exemption allowed a $50 billion "enterprise" to be audited by a three-person (one retired, one a secretary) accounting firm in New City, New York (a hamlet of the Town of Clarkson, whatever that means).

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act amended section 17(e) of the 34 Act to require SEC-registered firms be audited by accounting firms registered with the SOX-created Public Accounting Oversight Board. However, the SEC immediately exempted private firms from this requirement (Release 34-48281) and kept extending the waiver every year (34-50020, 34-52909, 34-54920) because it was, "consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors."

As reported by the New York Times, the latest ban was allowed to expire at the end of 2008. Just in time, too.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

SEC Update

All kinds of excitement at the SEC this week. Wait, did I say "excitement?" I need a vacation.

Peter M. Uhlmann, Chief of Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, announced that he will step down.

In a speech, Commissioner Aguliar argued that the SEC should be able to bring criminal cases. Also see this article from the American Lawyer.

The SEC announced that it would extend the deadline for a report on the costs and benefits of SOX 404.

The Financial Executives blog has a good post (with links) about the SEC's Report about updating the disclosure system.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

Blog Roundup: Looking on the Bright Side

This post on Naked Capitalism discusses an under-reported *upside* of mark-to-market accounting. In the third quarter, banks reclassified $610 billion in assets as "level 3" under FAS 157. The reclassification gives them much more flexibility in determining what the assets are worth.

The Center for Audit Quality (via Compliance Week) has good news for issuers who have lost accelerated filer status because their stock price is in the toilet: you don't have to file that SOX 404 auditor certification!

To be an accelerated filer, an issuer must have at least $70 million in market capitalization (market capitalization is number of shares outstanding multiplied by share price). For example, Astronics Corporation (Nasdaq:ATRO) fell below the accelerated filer cut-off in late November when its share price got below $8.22. At its current price ($8.10 x 8.51 million shares out) its market cap it $68.94 million. Earlier this year, it had a market cap of $455 million! Flotek Industries (NYSE:FTK) has had an even harder come down. In January it was a "large accelerated filer" with a market cap of $842 million. Now, after a 90% decline in share price, it has a market cap of $71.07 million.

SOX 404 has been the subject of much issuer consternation and the SEC repeatedly delayed its application to non-accelerated issuers.

Securities Docket has a post about the SEC's announcement that it is planning to distribute the fair fund from the Bear Stearns market-timing case. There's also a link to the text of the distribution plan.

Race to the Bottom has a nice summary of the corporate governance provisions of the Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act (HR 7231) as well as a status update.

Saturday, September 13, 2008

SON OF THE CLAWBACK!

Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley was supposed to create a mechanism allowing the SEC to recapture executive compensation distributed based on fishy accounting. As this article notes, 304 has never been used.

The Corporate Library recently reported that 300 companies had adopted private clawback mechanisms. For a thorough discussion, have a look at this post by Amy L. Goodman of Gibson Dunn on the Harvard Corporate Governance Blog.

If you seek precedents, Westlaw Business has canned searches to help find (a) recently adopted clawbacks and (b) 14a-8 challenges to shareholder clawback proposals.